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Abstract. We examine the problem of message recognition by reviewing the denitions and the
security model in the literature. In particular, we look at a protocol by Lucks et al. more closely
and note its inability to recover in case of a certain adversarial disruption. This shortcoming can
be xed by employing a separate resynchronization process and this has already been done in the
literature. However, it is also of interest to remedy this shortcoming without using a separate
procedure. We propose a new message recognition protocol, which is based on the original protocol
by Lucks et al., and incorporate the resynchronization technique within the protocol itself. That is,
without having to provide a separate resynchronization procedure, we overcome the recoverability
problem of the protocol. Moreover, we enumerate all possible attacks against the protocol and show
that none of the attacks can occur. We further prove the security of the protocol and its ability to
self-recover once the disruption has stopped.
1. Introduction
Entity recognition is a weaker security notion than entity authentication; it refers to the process
where two parties meet initially and one party can be assured in future conversations that it
is communicating with the same second party. There is an analogous correspondence between
message recognition and message authentication.
There have been several recent papers on designing protocols where the source of trust is a
narrow-band authenticated channel; see for example [3], [5], [8], [9], and [10]. In particular, there
has been recent interest in designing recognition protocols using this communication model. This
problem has been considered in a context where we are dealing with low-computational power
devices which cannot handle public-key computations and where no pre-deployed shared secret
exists. On the other hand, the devices have access to a narrow-band authenticated channel at the
initialization step and are later placed in a constrained, possibly hostile, insecure environment.
Lucks et al. [3] motivated this model with the following example. Let Alice and Bob be two
strangers who meet in a party for the rst time. They leave the party after making a bet. Some
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1days later, it turns out that Alice wins the bet. Afterward, Bob receives a message claiming to be
sent from Alice. The message includes a bank account number and asks Bob to deposit Alice's prize
to that bank account. Bob wants to be assured that this message is indeed sent from the entity
who introduced herself as \Alice" in the party. In other words, Bob needs to recognize \Alice",
whoever she is, or a message that is sent from her.
Now consider Alice and Bob to be two small devices who \meet" in a somewhat secure envi-
ronment that allows them to send authenticated, but not condential, messages. They are later
placed in a hostile environment where Alice wants Bob to recognize the messages sent from her
to Bob. An adversary, Eve, is present all along. When Alice and Bob rst meet, Eve can read
the authenticated messages, but cannot change them. Later, when Alice and Bob are placed in a
hostile environment, Eve can not only read, but also modify messages. She can also insert her own
messages claiming to be from either party. Eve's goal is to make Bob accept messages from her as
sent from Alice, where Alice has never, or at least not recently, sent those messages.
Since message recognition is weaker than message authentication, every message authentication
protocol trivially provides message recognition. Moreover, message recognition can be achieved
using public-key, when public-key computations are feasible, or secret-key cryptography, when pre-
deployed authentic information is available. However, in some scenarios, public-key computations
may be too costly and there may be no secure channel where the secret keys can be transmitted
condentially.
One can ask what security goals can be achieved in such a constrained model? There are claims
in the literature, see [10] for example, suggesting that achieving message authentication is not
possible in such an environment. Hence, they pursue the weaker security of message recognition.
We look at a message recognition protocol proposed by Lucks et al. in more detail and note that
in case of a particular adversarial disruption, this protocol fails to recover. In other words, the
adversary can trap one party in a state that he or she will no longer accept legitimate messages
that were sent by the other party. This inability to recover was noted previously [7] and xed by
calling upon a separate procedure called a \resynchronization protocol". We propose a message
recognition protocol that is able to recover without having to call a separate protocol. That is, the
proposed protocol has the advantage of self-recoverability. We formally prove that our protocol is
secure and fully recovers once the disruptions have stopped.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to examining previous recogni-
tion protocols and noting their shortcomings. In Section 3, we describe a new message recognition
protocol. Finally, Section 4 is devoted to proving the security and recoverability of the protocol.
2. Previous Recognition Protocols
In this section, we briey review the existing message recognition protocols and discuss their
usability in the context of networks with low-computational power devices that also have low
communication bandwidth.
There are two communication channels considered in the setting of recognition protocols: an
insecure broadband channel, denoted by !, and an authenticated non-condential narrow-band
2channel denoted by ). The broadband channel is available all the time and the narrow-band
channel is only accessible once, for the initial session between two users.
Weimerskirch et al. [10] proposed a protocol called Zero Common-Knowledge (ZCK). This pro-
tocol is the starting point of a series of recent publications; see for example [2], [3], [4], [7], [6]. The
ZCK protocol uses message authentication codes (MACs) and hash chains of the form ai = H(ai 1)
and bi = H(bi 1), i = 1;:::;n, as keys for the MACs. The length of the hash chain, n, is xed at
the beginning and H is a one-way hash function.
Hammell et al. [2] implemented the ZCK protocol and provided measurements and observations
as a proof-of-concept. They investigated whether the ZCK protocol suits devices with low computa-
tional power, low code space, low communication bandwidth, low energy resources. They concluded
that it does exhibit these requirements, however, denial-of-service and memory complexity are areas
of concern and needed to be addressed or improved upon in the future.
Hammell et al. did not investigate the security properties of the ZCK protocol, but rather relied
on the security proof that came along with it. However, Lucks et al. [3] found a mistake in the
security proof of this protocol and presented a practical attack against it. Moreover, using the
same idea of using values in a hash chain as keys for MACs, they proposed a message recognition
protocol that guards against the found attack. We describe the protocol proposed by Lucks et al.
in more detail. For ease of reference, we will refer to the protocol proposed by Lucks et al. as the
Lucks protocol.
A one-way hash function H : f0;1gs ! f0;1gs and a message authentication code MAC :
f0;1gs  f0;1g ! f0;1gc are considered as building blocks of this protocol. Typical parameters
are suggested to be s  80 and c  30. The maximum number of messages to be authenticated, or
the maximum number of sessions, in the Lucks protocol is xed to be n. Alice randomly chooses
a0 and forms a hash chain of the form ai = H(ai 1), i = 1;:::;n. Similarly, Bob randomly chooses
b0 and forms bi = H(bi 1), i = 1;:::;n. Alice and Bob will respectively use ai and bi as keys for
MAC values they compute in session i.
The initialization phase is constituted of Alice and Bob exchanging the values of an and bn. In
this phase of the execution, Eve is passive and the communication is denoted by ).
There will be n sessions of the protocol and we denote them in descending order by n 1;:::;0;
this is because the values of the hash chains are going to be revealed in this order. In each session
i, Alice would like to authenticate a message mi. She uses ai as the key for the MAC and sends
the MAC value of mi to Bob. Bob then authenticates himself to Alice by revealing bi. Once Alice
has veried bi, she reveals ai. Then ai allows Bob to verify Alice and mi. Once the session is over,
Alice and Bob \move down" in the hash chain and use ai 1 and bi 1 as keys for session i   1.
Lucks et al. write accept-key(k) when a key k has been accepted, and commit-message(m;i) when
Alice commits herself to authenticate m in session i. Similarly, accept-message(m;i) indicates that
Bob has accepted m as sent from Alice in session i. The formal description of the Lucks protocol
is given next.
Alice's internal state in the Lucks protocol is as follows:
 i, the session counter
3 bi+1, the most recently accepted value of Bob's hash chain (hence accept-key(bi+1) has
occurred already)
 a one-bit ag, to distinguish the program states A0 and A1.
Similarly, Bob's internal state is:
 i, the session counter
 ai+1, the most recently accepted value of Alice's hash chain (hence accept-key(ai+1) has
occurred already)
 a one-bit ag, to distinguish the program states B0 and B1.
Session i of the Lucks protocol:
A0 (Alice's initial program state) Obtain mi (possibly from Eve), then
Commit-message(mi;i).
Compute di = MACai(mi).
Send (di;mi); goto A1.
A1 Wait for a message b0 (supposedly from Bob), then
If H(b0) = bi+1 then
Let bi := b0, accept-key(bi) and send ai. Let i := i   1 and goto A0
else goto A1.
B0 (Bob's initial program state) Wait for a message (di;mi), then send bi and goto B1.
B1 Wait for a message a0 (supposedly from Alice), then
If H(a0) = ai+1 then
Let ai := a0 and accept-key(ai).
If MACa0(mi) = di then
Accept mi as authentic in session i
(else do not accept any message for session i).
Let i := i   1 and goto B0
else goto B1.
Lucks et al. present their protocol in an extended abstract [3], and prove its security in the full
version of the paper [4]. The protocol is proved to be secure given that the preimage resistance,
second preimage resistance, and unforgeability properties, and their hash chain equivalents, hold.
These properties are described in Section 4.
Although the Lucks protocol is provably secure, it nonetheless falls short in case of a certain
adversarial disruption. In particular, Eve can easily manipulate one party to move forward to the
next session, while the other party is still in the previous session. In such a case, a party could get
trapped in a state and never be able to nish execution of a session; as a result, he or she remains
stuck in that state forever. This particular disruption was previously noted in [7].
Figure 1 illustrates a situation where Bob is trapped by Eve in program state B1. The condition
in program state B1 fails since ai+1 6= H(a0
i). This will cause Bob to stay in B1 waiting for a new
ai. Now even if Alice sends him a legitimate message mi, he will ignore it. Although this looks
like a denial of service attack, it is much stronger than that. Eve can go away and yet Alice and
4Bob are still unable to communicate because Bob is trapped. The details of the disruption are as
follows.
Eve sends m0
i and d0
i to Bob and he will automatically decrement his index to i while Alice does
not. Eve chooses a0
i such that ai+1 6= H(a0
i), which will make Bob wait for a new ai. While he is
waiting for a new ai, he will not accept a message of the form (mj;dj), for any j. Hence, even if
Alice sends him a legitimate message, he will ignore it. As a result, he is \trapped" in state B1.
Lucks et al. suggest that Bob sends bi again after he has waited for too long to receive the correct
ai. However, when Alice has not initiated the session and is not anticipating bi, it is not clear what
she is supposed to do. Hence, this will not help the protocol recover in case of this particular
disruption.
Eve Bob
Choose random m0
i and d0
i.
m0
i;d0
i         ! Move to the next time-frame upon reception of
the new message.
bi          
Choose a0
i such that ai+1 6= H(a0
i).
a0
i         ! Since ai+1 6= H(a0
i), wait for a new ai.
Figure 1. Eve \trapping" Bob in state B1
Eve can play the same trick with Alice and trap her in program state A1 for an indeterminate
period of time; Figure 2 illustrates this situation.
Alice Eve
Input (mi, Bob).
commit-message(mi;i).
Compute di = MACai(mi).
mi;di         !
Since bi+1 6= H(b0
i), wait for a new bi.
b0
i           Choose b0
i such that bi+1 6= H(b0
i).
Figure 2. Eve \trapping" Alice in state A1
Once again, we note that this inability to recover is a problem since the adversary does not need
to continue her active involvement. She can leave the network and yet Alice and Bob will no longer
be able to have successful communication.
As was mentioned before, [7] rst noted these disruptions and proposed an improved version
of the protocol which is equipped with a separate resynchronization protocol to x this problem.
Although the improved version of the protocol along with the resynchronization protocol fully
recovers from these noted disruptions, it is of interest to design a protocol that recovers on its own,
without having to call upon an external protocol. That is, a protocol that attains self-recoverability
is usually preferred to a protocol that depends on a second protocol when trying to recover.
Next, we propose a message recognition protocol which attains self-recoverability in case of the
noted disruptions.
53. A New Message Recognition Protocol
We describe the details of our proposed recognition protocol in this section, while the security
and recoverability analyses are postponed to the next session. Although this protocol is based on
the original protocol proposed by Lucks et al., the logic of the instructions of Alice and Bob has
changed considerably. Moreover, the information exchanged between Alice and Bob has changed
as well.
Note that each pair of users can execute this protocol. However, there must be a dierent pair
of hash chains for each pair of communicating users. It is implicitly assumed that Alice and Bob
are the communicating parties in the rest of the paper.
The initialization phase and the setup of the hash chains are exactly as in the Lucks protocol.
The internal state of Alice includes (along with each variable's initial value):
 iA := n   1: the position of Alice in her chain.
 iacceptA := n: the last index of Bob's chain that was accepted by Alice.
 bA := bn: the last value of Bob's chain that was accepted by Alice.
 M := Null: the input message to be authenticated in the current session.
 a one-bit ag, to distinguish the program states A0 and A1.
Similarly, Bob's internal state is as follows:
 iB := n   1: the position of Bob in his chain.
 iacceptB := n: the last index of Alice's chain that was accepted by Bob.
 aB := an: the last value of Alice's chain that was accepted by Bob.
 e0 := Null: the MAC value received in the current session, supposedly from Alice.
 M0 := Null: the message received in the current session, supposedly from Alice.
 a one-trit ag, to distinguish the program states B0, B1, and B2.
Alice and Bob start in program states A0 and B0. We write commit-message(M;iA) to indicate
that Alice is committing herself to sending the message M to Bob in session iA. We let T be the
maximum amount of time Alice waits to receive a response from Bob, and vice versa.
A0 is executed as follows:
If iA  0 then Abort.
Receive input (M) and commit-message(M;iA).
Compute eiA := MACaiA(iAkM).
Send [eiA;M] to Bob and goto A1.
B0 is executed as follows:
If iB  0 then Abort.
Wait to receive [e0;M0], then goto B1.
B1 has the following description:
Send [iB;biB] to Alice and goto B2.
A1 is performed in the following manner:
Wait at most time T to receive [i0
B;b0].
6If [i0
B;b0] is received, then
If i0
B = iacceptA and bA = b0 (Bob has not received the last ow of the previous session)
then
Let N := Null.
Send [iacceptA;aiacceptA;N] and goto A0.
If i0
B = iA and bA = H(b0) then (Alice and Bob seem to be synchronized.)
Let N := M.
Send [iA;aiA;N] to Bob.
Let iacceptA := i0
B, bA := b0 and iA := iA   1. (Alice updates her state.)
goto A0.
else Resend [eiA;M] to Bob and goto A1.
If timeout then
Resend [eiA;M] to Bob and goto A1.
B2 is performed as follows:
Wait at most time T to receive [i0
A;a0;N0].
If [i0
A;a0;N0] is received, then
If i0
A = iB and aB = H(a0) then (Alice and Bob seem to be synchronized.)
If N0 = M0 and e0 = MACa0(i0
AkM0) then
Accept(M0, iB).
else Accept(Null).
Let iacceptB := i0
A, aB := a0 and iB := iB   1. (Bob updates his state.)
goto B0.
else goto B1.
If timeout, then goto B1.
Figure 3 illustrates the main steps of this protocol. For simplicity, the instructions on what to do
in case one party does not receive any response from the other party is not included in the gure.
If either Alice or Bob receives a message that they did not expect, they are going to ignore it.
For instance, while Alice is in state A1 and is waiting to receive a message of the form (iB;b),
she is going to ignore messages of the form (M0) that request for a new session and correspond
to state A0. Analogously, when Bob is in state B2, he is waiting for a message of type iA;a;N.
He is going to ignore messages of the form e0
iA;M0 since they correspond to state B0. In general,
each party only acts on received messages that have the expected structure in accordance to their
current program state.
When Alice is waiting in state A1 for Bob to respond, she is set to wait for time T. If she
receives a message i0
B;b0 in time T, then she processed it in state A1, and otherwise, she resends
eiA;M to Bob. Similarly, Bob waits to receive a message i0
A;a0;N0, supposedly from Alice, for time
T. If he does not receive such a message, he resends iB;b to Alice.
Note that Eve can block the last ow of Alice, iA;a;N. In this case, Alice has decremented her
state, while Bob is waiting to receive iA;a;N, and possibly resending iB;biB to remind Alice to
send him iA;a;N. However, since Alice has moved her state to A0, she will ignore Bob's messages.
7Alice Bob
Internal state: iA, iacceptA, bA, M Internal state: iB, iacceptB, aB, e
0, M
0
A0: B0:
If iA  0 then Abort. If iB  0 then Abort.
Receive (M) and commit-message(M;iA).
Compute eiA := MACaiA
(iAkM).
Send [eiA;M].
eiA;M
            ! Receive [e
0;M
0].
A1: B1:
Receive [i
0
B;b
0].
iB;biB               Send [iB;biB].
If i
0
B = iacceptA and bA = b
0 then
Let N := Null.
Send [iacceptA;aiacceptA;N] and goto A0.
If i
0
B = iA and bA = H(b
0) then
Let N := M. B2:
Send [iA;aiA;N].
iA;aiA;N
            ! Receive [i
0
A;a
0;N
0].
Let iacceptA := i
0
B, bA := b
0 and iA := iA   1. If i
0
A = iB and aB = H(a
0) then
goto A0. If N
0 = M
0 and e
0 = MACa0(i
0
AkM
0) then
else Resend [eiA;M] and goto A1. Accept(M
0, iB).
else Accept(Null).
Let iacceptB := i
0
A, aB := a
0 and iB := iB   1.
goto B0.
else goto B1.
Figure 3. Our Proposed Message Recognition Protocol (Common Case)
This may appear to be problematic since Bob is waiting for Alice. However, once Alice is ready
to authenticate a new message to Bob, she will be in program state A1 again, and communication
will resume.
4. Security of Our New Message Recognition Protocol
In this section, we begin by listing the required security properties of the hash function H and the
message authentication code MAC. Then, we consider dierent types of possible attacks against
our protocol. Finally, we conclude with a theorem which ensures the security of our protocol.
4.1. Security Assumptions.
In this section, we list the security assumptions required for this protocol. These denitions are
notions dened by Lucks et al. [3].
Denition 1. Let secret y0;y1;:::;yi and known yi+1 be chosen such that yi+1 = H(yi), yi =
H(yi 1);:::; y1 = H(y0). A hash function H is referred to as a depth-i preimage resistant
(i-PR) hash function when it is infeasible to nd y0 such that yi+1 = H(y0).
Denition 2. Let secret y0;y1;:::;yi 1 and known yi;yi+1 be chosen such that yi+1 = H(yi),
yi = H(yi 1);:::; y1 = H(y0). A hash function H is depth-i second preimage resistant
(i-SPR) when it is infeasible to nd y0, y0 6= yi, such that yi+1 = H(y0).
Denition 3. Let secret y0;y1;:::;yi and known yi+1 be chosen such that yi+1 = H(yi), yi =
H(yi 1);:::; y1 = H(y0). A message authentication code MAC is depth-i existentially un-
forgeable if it is infeasible to mount an existential forgery against MACyi in an adaptive chosen
message attack scenario.
84.2. Single-session Attacks.
In this section, we consider attacks that are started and completed in a single session. We assume
that Eve has stayed passive all along and she becomes active in the current session for the rst
time. In case of a successful attack, Bob will accept some message M0 in the same session, where
M0 is not Null and not the message sent by Alice in that session. Since Eve has been passive
before this session, we will have iA = iB at the start of the session; we let i := iA = iB for ease of
reference. For the same reason, we have iacceptA = iacceptB = i + 1. Furthermore, Alice and Bob
will have accepted all the intended keys so far. That is, aB = ai+1 and bA = bi+1.
We now want to exhaustively list all possible single-session attacks. We follow the notation of [1]
in referring to dierent orderings of the ows. In each attack, the adversary sends a ow to either
Alice or Bob and receives a ow in response. This notation labels a ow by A if the recipient is
Alice, or by B when the recipient is Bob. For instance, the following attack scenario corresponds
to the attack type of ABAB:
 A: Eve sends M to Alice and she responds with eiA;M.
 B: Eve sends e0;M0 to Bob and he replies with iB;biB.
 A: Eve sends i0
B;b0 to Alice and receives iA;aiA;N from her.
 B: Eve sends i0
A;a0;N0 to Bob.
The number of distinct attacks against a three ow protocol is proved to be
 4
2

= 6 in [1]. These
attacks are denoted AABB, ABBA, BABA, ABAB, BBAA, and BAAB. We will look at these
dierent attacks separately. We stress that [1] formally proves this list to be an exhaustive list of
all possible types of attacks.
One can show that the BABA attack scenario can be reduced to the ABBA attack. That is, if an
adversary Oscar can mount a successful attack of type BABA, then Eve can use Oscar and succeed
in the ABBA attack scenario. Similarly, we can show that the BAAB and ABBA attack scenarios
are reduced to the ABAB case. We outline these three reductions in the Appendix. It remains
to analyze the other three attack scenarios, namely AABB, BBAA, and ABAB. We will reduce a
successful adversary in these attacks to a player who can mount a depth-i existential forgery or can
nd depth-i preimages or depth-i second preimages.
4.2.1. Attack of Type AABB.
Figure 4 depicts an attack of type AABB.
If i0
A 6= iB, Bob will not accept any messages. Since iA = iB = i, Eve has to set i0
A := iA in order
to succeed. Moreover, Alice reveals iA and aiA only if b0 is veried; that is, if bA = H(b0) (note that
bA = bi+1, as discussed before).
Eve rst interacts with Alice and has to nd b0 before seeing biB = bi. This implies that she has
found a preimage of bA = bi+1. This exactly translates to the notion of i-PR dened in Def. 1.
4.2.2. Attack of Type BBAA.
Figure 5 illustrates the attack of type BBAA.
Alice tries to deceive Bob before she starts interacting with Alice. In order to succeed, Eve
needs to present Bob with an a0 such that aB = H(a0), without having seen aiA = ai (note that
9Alice Eve Bob
M                       A
eiA;M
                    !
i0
B;b0
                      A
iA;aiA;N
                    !
B
e0;M0
                    !
iB;biB                      
B
i0
A;a0;N0
                    !
Figure 4. Attack of Type AABB
Alice Eve Bob
B
e0;M0
                    !
iB;biB                      
B
i0
A;a0;N0
                    !
M                       A
eiA;M
                    !
i0
B;b0
                      A
iA;aiA;N
                    !
Figure 5. Attack of Type BBAA
aB = ai+1, as discussed before). In other words, she is trying to nd a preimage of aB = ai+1.
If Eve can successfully nd such a preimage, the she translates to a successful player who nds
depth-i preimages, as dened in Def. 1.
4.2.3. Attack of Type ABAB.
Depicted in Fig. 6 is the ABAB attack.
In this scenario, Eve receives biB = bi before she has to send b0 to Alice. We analyze the two
cases b0 = bi and b0 6= bi separately.
If b0 6= bi, then it implies that Eve has found a depth-i second preimage of bA = bi+1.
Otherwise, b0 = bi. Alice will verify b0 = bi and reveal aiA = ai. Eve now has two choices. She
chooses a0 such that either a0 = aiA or a0 6= aiA. If a0 6= aiA, then she has found a depth-i second
preimage of ai+1 = aB. On other hand, if a0 = aiA, then for Eve to succeed, she must set N0 := M0
and she must have set e0 := MACa0(i0
AkM0) before learning a0. That is, Eve has successfully forged
a MAC. This reduces to the notion of depth-i existential forgery dened in Def. 3.
10Alice Eve Bob
M                       A
eiA;M
                    !
B
e0;M0
                    !
iB;biB                      
i0
B;b0
                      A
iA;aiA;N
                    !
B
i0
A;a0;N0
                    !
Figure 6. Attack of Type ABAB
4.3. Multi-session Attacks.
Having ruled out the possibility of single-session attacks, we now turn our attention to multi-
session attacks. Consider attack scenarios which occur over two or more sessions. In such a case, the
adversary becomes active in one session and concludes her attack in one of the following sessions.
In case of a successful attack, Bob will accept M0 in the last session of the attack, where M0 is not
Null and not the message sent by Alice in that session.
Just before Eve becomes active, similar to the single-session attack scenario discussed above, we
must have iA = iB and iacceptA = iacceptB = iA + 1. We again let i := iA = iB for ease of reference.
Moreover, all of the intended keys will have been accepted to this point, so as a result, aB = ai+1
and bA = bi+1.
We now assume that during session i, Eve becomes active by initiating a ow with either Alice
or Bob, or changing the information sent by them. Since we are considering multi-session attacks,
the attack should not entirely take place in one session. As a result, Eve is not making Bob accept
her message M0 immediately after she becomes active. The following three cases can happen once
Eve becomes active:
Case 1. Bob is not engaged right away. That is, Eve rst interacts with Alice.
Case 2. Bob is engaged right away and he outputs the message M, sent by Alice.
Case 3. Bob is engaged right away and he outputs Null.
We discuss each case separately.
Case 1. Let us assume that Eve rst interacts with Alice and does not engage Bob. In order for
Alice to conclude her session, she must receive i0
B;b0 such that i0
B = i and bi+1 = H(b0).
Otherwise, Alice will detect that something is going on, hence, she will not reveal i;ai and,
instead, will resend ei;M. If Eve wants to remain undetected and be able to continue with
her attack, she needs to send i0
B;b0 such that i0
B = i and bi+1 = H(b0). This means that
Eve has found a depth-i preimage of bi+1.
11Case 2. Now assume that Bob is engaged and he outputs the message M, sent by Alice. That is, on
input (M), Alice has sent ei;M to Bob. Since Bob accepts M at the end, it means that he,
indeed, has received M in the rst ow. Moreover, for Bob to accept M, he must receive
i0
A;a0;N0 such that i0
A = i, ai+1 = H(a0), and N0 = M. There are three dierent cases to
consider here.
{ Not having received i;ai;M from Alice, Eve nds i0
A;a0;N0 such that i0
A = i and
ai+1 = H(a0). That is, she nds a depth-i preimage of ai+1.
{ Having received i;ai;M from Alice, Eve nds i0
A;a0;N0 such that i0
A = i, ai+1 = H(a0),
and ai 6= a0. That is, she nds a depth-i second preimage of ai+1.
{ Eve sets i0
A;a0;N0 = i;ai;M. That is, Eve relays Alice's last ow. Note that Alice
reveals her last ow only if she receives i0
B;b0 such that i0
B = i and bi+1 = H(b0). There
are again three cases to consider here. Either Eve has found a depth-i preimage of bi+1,
she has found a depth-i second preimage of bi+1, or she has relayed i;b faithfully. In
the latter case, Eve has faithfully relayed all messages, and this does not constitute an
attack by an active adversary. This contradicts our assumption that Eve rst becomes
active in session i.
Case 3. Bob is engaged right away and he outputs Null. This means that he has received and
veried i0
A and a0. There are again three cases to consider. Either Eve has found a depth-i
preimage of ai+1, or she has found a depth-i second preimage of ai+1, or i0
A and a0 are the
correct i;ai as revealed by Alice. In this last case, Alice and Bob have successfully remained
synchronized, but were unable to authenticate the messages they intended to authenticate.
The above discussion concludes that in the session immediately after Eve becomes active, she
can only stop Alice and Bob from authenticating the intended message, but she cannot bring them
out of their synchronized states unless she is able to solve the depth-i PR or depth-i SPR problems
dened in Denitions 1 and 2. Moreover, if Alice and Bob are synchronized at the beginning of a
session, then they will end the session in a synchronized state, unless Eve is able to nd depth-i
preimages or depth-i second preimages.
At the beginning of a multi-session attack, Alice and Bob are synchronized. The above discussion
implies that they remain synchronized until the very last session of the attack. We can look at
this last session of the attack separately and think of it as a single-session attack. As a result, any
multi-session attack translates to a single-session attack, which were already ruled out in Section 4.2.
Note that the adversary can only exhaust Alice's and Bob's values of the hash chain one at a
time. That is, she can not make them jump more than one step down the hash chain values.
4.4. Self-recoverability.
In this section, we show that once Eve stops interfering with their message ows, Alice and Bob
will be able to resume successful communication of recognized messages. Because we have already
shown that Alice and Bob remain synchronized in their i values throughout an active attack by
Eve (under the security assumptions on H and MAC), we need only show that they do not get
\trapped" in a program state, as was the case in the Lucks protocol, for example.
12We consider the possible combinations of program states which Alice and Bob are in when Eve
becomes passive. We rst consider the case where Alice is in state A1.
 If Alice is in A1 and Bob is in B0, then after time T, Alice will resend [eiA;M] to Bob,
which will cause him to leave state B0, and the protocol will continue.
 If Alice is in A1 and Bob is in B1, then Bob will send [iB;biB] to Alice and advance to B2,
which will cause her to send an appropriate message to Bob, and herself return to A0. Bob
will return to B0, though he may Accept(Null) if Eve forged the M0 which caused Bob to
enter the B1 state. This can of course only aect the rst Accept after Eve's interference,
however.
 If Alice is in A1 and Bob is in B2, then Alice will be resending useless messages to Bob,
and staying in A1, but after time T, Bob will return to B1, and we proceed as above.
If Alice is in A0, then no progress will be made until the next time she tries to send a message
to Bob. At that point, Alice will enter state A1, and the analysis continues as above.
4.5. Main Theorem.
The above discussion concludes the discussion of the security and self-recoverability of the pro-
posed message recognition protocol, and forms the proof of the following theorem.
Security and Self-recoverability Theorem. A successful adversary against the protocol of
Section 3 who eciently deceives Bob into accepting (M0,i), where M0 is not Null and Alice did not
send M0 in session i, implies an ecient algorithm that nds depth-i preimages or depth-i second
preimages, or creates depth-i existential forgeries. Moreover, the adversary cannot stop Alice and
Bob from successfully executing the protocol unless she is actively disrupting the communication for
the lifetime of Alice and Bob.
5. Conclusion
We briey reviewed the denitions and the security model of message recognition protocols in
the literature. We looked at the message recognition protocol proposed by Lucks et al. [3] in more
detail and described its inability to recover in case of a certain adversarial disruption, previously
noted in the literature. We proposed a new message recognition protocol, which is based on the
original protocol by Lucks et al., and which incorporates a resynchronization technique within itself
to provide self-recoverability. That is, the proposed protocol overcomes the recoverability problem
of the Lucks et al. protocol without having to provide a separate resynchronization procedure.
Finally, we formally proved the security of our protocol.
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Appendix A. Reducing Three Single-session Attacks
As was described in Section 4, Gehrmann [1] formally proves that there are only six possible
types of single-session attack against the protocol of Figure 3. We analyzed the AABB, BBAA, and
ABAB attacks in that section. Here we examine the remaining three attacks: BABA, BAAB, and
ABBA. The BABA attack is reduced to the ABBA attack. Then, the ABBA attack is reduced to
the ABAB attack. Finally, the BAAB attack is also reduced to the ABAB attack. This concludes
the analysis of the six dierent attack scenarios.
A.1. Reducing the BABA attack to an ABBA attack.
The ABBA attack scenario, depicted in Fig. 7, is as follows:
 A: Oscar sends M to Alice and receives eiA;M from her.
 B: Oscar sends e0;M0 to Bob and he sends iB;biB.
 B: Oscar sends i0
A;a0;N0 to Bob.
 A: Oscar sends i0
B;b0 to Alice and she replies with iA;aiA;N.
On the other hand, the BABA attack scenario, illustrated in Fig. 8, is as follows:
 B: Oscar sends e0;M0 to Bob and he sends iB;biB.
 A: Oscar sends M to Alice and receives eiA;M from her.
 B: Oscar sends i0
A;a0;N0 to Bob.
 A: Oscar sends i0
B;b0 to Alice and she replies with iA;aiA;N.
These two attack scenarios dier in the order of the rst two steps and are identical otherwise.
In the BABA attack scenario, Oscar commits to e0 and M0 before receiving eiA. Note that knowing
eiA could possibly help him in choosing e0. On the other hand, Oscar receives iB and biB before
sending M. The adversary knows the value of iB. Moreover, the choice of M is independent of the
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Figure 7. Attack of Type ABBA
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Figure 8. Attack of Type BABA
value of biB. In other words, knowing biB is not going to help the adversary in choosing M. Hence,
if Oscar can win in the BABA attack scenario by rst committing to e0 and M0 and then receiving
eiA, then he can win the ABBA attack scenario with the same values M;M0; and e.
A.2. Reducing the ABBA attack to an ABAB attack.
Recall the ABAB attack scenario from Section 4:
 A: Oscar sends M to Alice and receives eiA;M from her.
 B: Oscar sends e0;M0 to Bob and he sends iB;biB.
 A: Oscar sends i0
B;b0 to Alice and she replies with iA;aiA;N.
 B: Oscar sends i0
A;a0;N0 to Bob.
The ABBA attack diers from the ABAB attack in the order of the last two steps. In the ABAB
attack, Oscar receives iA;aiA;N from Alice, and then he has to send i0
A;a0;N0 to Bob. Knowing
iA;aiA;N can help him choose a winning i0
A;a0;N0, whereas in the ABBA attack scenario, Oscar
15sends i0
A;a0;N0 before seeing iA;aiA;N. If Oscar has a winning strategy in the ABBA attack
scenario, then using the same values of i0
A;a0;N0, he will win the ABAB attack scenario.
A.3. Reducing the BAAB attack to an ABAB attack.
The BAAB attack scenario is as follows:
 B: Oscar sends e0;M0 to Bob and he sends iB;biB.
 A: Oscar sends M to Alice and receives eiA;M from her.
 A: Oscar sends i0
B;b0 to Alice and she replies with iA;aiA;N.
 B: Oscar sends i0
A;a0;N0 to Bob.
Figure 9 depicts this attack.
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Figure 9. Attack of Type BAAB
The analysis of this case is analogous to that of Section A.1. The BAAB attack scenario diers
from the ABAB attack scenario in the order of the rst two steps. In the BAAB attack scenario,
Oscar has to commit to e0 and M0 before seeing eiA. Although Oscar receives iB and biB before
sending M, these values are independent of the choice of M. That is, seeing biB is not going to
help the adversary in choosing M. Hence, a winning strategy in the BAAB attack scenario reduces
to a winning strategy in the ABAB attack scenario.
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